Logical / physical address state lifecycle management

ABSTRACT

A system and method for managing logical and physical address state lifecycles. A state of unknown can be assigned to an address when the state has not been assigned. The state of the address is changed when communication is targeted to the address. The state can be changed to unfulfilled when the communication includes an address resolution protocol request sent to a device having the address when a time limit for a response to the address resolution protocol request has not expired. The state can be changed to virtual when the communication is received at the address when the state of the address is unfulfilled, and a time limit for responding to the communication expires before a response is sent. The state can be changed to unknown when the state of the address is not unknown, and the address does not participate in the communication within a time limit.

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims the benefit of priority based on U.S.Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 60/415,290, filed Oct. 1, 2002,entitled “System and Method for Detecting and Managing NetworkIntrusion,” and naming Mark L. Wilkinson, Ronald J. Miller, and MichaelJ. McDaniels as the inventors and based on U.S. patent application Ser.No. 10/676,505 issued as U.S. Pat. No. 8,260,961, entitled“Logical/Physical Address State Lifecycle Management,” and naming MarkL. Wilkinson, Ronald J. Miller, and Michael J. McDaniels as theinventors. The above-referenced applications are hereby incorporated byreference herein in its entirety.

This application is related to U.S. patent application Ser. No.10/262,321, filed Oct. 1, 2002, entitled “System and Method for ManagingNetwork Communications,” and naming Mark L. Wilkinson, Ronald J. Miller,and Michael J. McDaniels as the inventors. The above-referencedapplication is hereby incorporated by reference herein in its entirety.

Portions of this patent application contain materials that are subjectto copyright protection. The copyright owner has no objection to thefacsimile reproduction by anyone of the patent document, or the patentdisclosure, as it appears in the Patent and Trademark Office file orrecords, but otherwise reserves all copyright rights whatsoever.

FIELD OF INVENTION

This invention, in general, relates to a system and method for managingthe lifecycle of logical and physical addresses. More specifically, thisinvention relates to initializing an address state to unknown when theaddress state is not defined and changing the address state when acommunication is targeted to the address.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Global networking of computers has greatly impacted business. As thenumber of computers linked to networks grows, businesses increasinglyrely on networks to interact. More and more people use email, websites,various file transfer methods, and remote office applications, amongothers, to facilitate business transactions and perform job relatedtasks.

These applications and uses still rely on early network addressingtechnologies and flow control protocols to transmit data packets acrossnetworks. For example, the Internet Protocol (IP) is an addressingprotocol for referencing remote devices on a network. ‘The protocol isimplemented to include a packet header that contains bits representingan address of the source, an address of the target, and various otherparameters associated with the packet. The Address Resolution Protocol(ARP) is used to reconcile physical addresses on local segments of anetwork with IP addresses. Other protocols are used for flow controlincluding TCP and UDP. These protocols may b-e used to control ˜he flowof packets across a network including subdividing and reassembling thepackets. TCP also includes methods for: verifying the arrival of apacket. Other protocols include ICMP, IPX, SPX, NetBios, and ARP, amongothers; Historically, these protocols were designed for use on a trustednetwork and as such do not include many security features. To addressthis problem, newer protocols are designed to include some securitymeasures. However, at present, the global Internet and many local areanetworks predominantly use older protocols with various vulnerabilities.

Hackers and malfeasants take advantage of the weaknesses in theseprotocols to disrupt, infiltrate, or destroy networked devices. Theseattacks include worms, viruses, denial-of-service, and infiltrationattacks, among others. Worms are self-replicating programs that infectcomputers. In some cases, these worms take advantage of thetrusting—relationships between computers to infiltrate network and sendnetwork data to the attacker. —Viruses infect files and utilizevulnerabilities of programs that interpret the files to propagate. Avirus may also function to erase data. Denial-of-services (DoS) attacksoften limit the network activity of a target computer by inundating thetarget with requests or messages. In one example, an attacking computeror set of computers may send a plethora of low level pings to the targetdevice. If the pings include a non-existent return address, the targetmachine could send a response message and pause over a timeout periodfor a response. In attempting to respond to the pings, the machineeffectively denies network access to other applications.

Infiltrating attacks often circumvent password security and gain accessto files. Once the attacker has access, they may steal privateinformation such as credit card or social security numbers. Moreover,they may damage valuable data, install a worm or spying program, orinstall programs to utilize computational capacity.

The FBI reports that millions of dollars are lost each year as a resultof these attacks. In the “2002 Computer Crimes and Security Survey,” asmuch as 90% of the Fortune 2000 companies reported breaches in computersecurity. According to the survey, each successful attack costcorporations an average of $2.1 Million The losses include lost data,employee time used in recovering data, delays in existing projects, anddamage to equipment. Fifty fj.ve percent of the companies surveysreported denial-of-service attacks, 70% reported infiltration andvandalism attacks, and twelve percent reported theft of transactioninformation.

Hackers use various tools and methodologies to discover vulnerabledevices and interact with them. These tools include address scanners,port scanners, worms, and packet formulation programs, among others. Forexample, a hacker may send reconnaissance packets to a local networksegment in search of a computer or device. Once a device is found, thehacker may scan the ports on the device in search of a vulnerable port.

Several approaches exist for protection against hackers. Typically,these protections are defensive shield-like methods. The most common arefirewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and anti-virus software.Firewalls are devices typically placed as shields between a localnetwork and the •global network. Firewalls are the most common form ofnetwork protection. They perform their function by limitingcommunication between—the local network and global network in accordancewith various filters and rules. Typically, network traffic is eitherblocked or permitted based on rules regarding protocols, addressing, andport number. These filters are infrequently changed and canunintentionally encumber certain permissible network traffic whilepermitting unwanted traffic.

Intrusion detection systems detect intrusions or attacks and reportthese attacks to network security. The systems predominantly use packetsignatures to evaluate network packets. However, these systems have beenshown to be unreliable as they can generate false positive results.Often, the systems collapse under the weight of the data they collect.Further, these systems may not detect packets with signatures that arenot found in their signature database, resulting in false negatives aswell. Moreover, these systems often present the data to network securityin a format that prevents timely response to threats.

Similarly, anti-virus software typically relies on file signatures todetect viruses. As such, frequent updates are required to maintain acurrent database of virus signatures. If an undocumented virus entersthe network, the anti-virus software will likely fail.

Many network security systems suffer from deficiencies in detecting andpreventing attacks on a network. Many other problems and disadvantagesof the prior art will become apparent to one skilled in the art ofnetworks security systems after comparing such prior art with thepresent invention as described herein.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Aspects of the invention may be found in a system, method, andcomputer-readable medium for managing logical and physical address statelifecycles. The method can include assigning a respective state ofunknown to a first address of multiple addresses when the respectivestate of the first address has not been assigned. The method furtherincludes changing the respective state of the first address when acommunication is targeted to the first address. The addresses caninclude all valid logical addresses for a corresponding set of deviceson a segment of a network, or all valid physical addresses for acorresponding set of devices on a segment of a network.

The respective state of the first address can be changed to used whenthe communication indicates that the first address corresponds to adevice in use. The respective state of the first address can be changedto unfulfilled when the communication includes an address resolutionprotocol request sent to a device having the first address when a timelimit for a response to the address resolution protocol request has notexpired. The respective state of the first address can be changed toomitted when the first address corresponds to a device, andcommunication with the device is omitted from being observed. Inaddition, the respective state of the first address can be changed toomitted when the respective state of the first address is programmed tobe omitted from the changing.

The respective state of the first address can be changed to virtual whenthe communication is received at the first address when the respectivestate of the first address is unfulfilled, and a time limit forresponding to the communication expires before a response is sent by thefirst address. The respective state of the first address 9 an be changedto unknown when the respective state of the first address is notunknown, and the first address does not participate in the communicationwithin a time limit. The respective state of the first address can bechanged to automatic when an automatic reply is programmed to be sent toa second address when the first address receives a packet from thesecond address.

Additional aspects of the invention may be found in a system formanaging logical and physical address state lifecycles. The system mayb: a computational device including a processor or network interface andmemory or computer-readable medium, among others. The device may or maynot include a user interface. Further, the device may have various dataand instructions associated with various methods for managing logicaland physical address state lifecycles. These data may include an ARPrequest queue, an IP state table, a frequency table, an ARP table, awatch list, a threat list, a synthetic physical address table, and acommunications stream table, among others. The device may also includepacket instructions for evaluating reconnaissance rules, behavioralrules and other rules, among others. Further, the system may includesoftware or computer interpretable instructions for performing variousmethods associated with maintaining the data in the tables andcollecting the data for the tables.

As such, a system, method and computer-readable medium for managinglogical and physical address state lifecycles are described. Otheraspects, advantages and novel features of the present invention willbecome apparent from the detailed description of the invention whenconsidered in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

For a more complete understanding of the present invention andadvantages thereof, reference is now made to the following descriptiontaken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in which likereference numbers indicate like features and wherein:

FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram depicting a network and networkdevices according to the invention;

FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment ofa network as seen in FIG. 1;

FIG. 3 is a block flow diagram depicting an exemplary method for use bythe system as seen in FIG. 1;

FIG. 4 is a block flow diagram depicting an exemplary method for use bythe system as seen in FIG. 1;

FIG. 5 is a block flow diagram depicting an exemplary method for use bythe system as seen in FIG. 1;

FIG. 6 is a block flow diagram depicting an exemplary method for use bythe system as seen in FIG. 1;

FIG. 7 is a block flow diagram depicting an exemplary method for use bythe system as seen in FIG. 1;

FIG. 8 is a block flow diagram depicting an exemplary method for use bythe system as seen in FIG. 1;

FIG. 9 is a block flow diagram depicting an exemplary method for use bythe system as seen in FIG. 1;

FIG. 10 is a block flow diagram depicting an exemplary method for use bythe system as seen in FIG. 1;

FIG. 11 is a block flow diagram depicting an exemplary method for use bythe system as seen in FIG. 1;

FIG. 12 is a schematic depicting an exemplary embodiment of an ARP queueas used in the method as seen in FIGS. 5-11;

FIG. 13 is a block flow diagram depicting an exemplary method for use inevaluating the ARP queue as seen in FIG. 12;

FIG. 14 is an exemplary embodiment of a watch list as used in themethods as seen in FIGS. 5-11;

FIG. 15 is a block flow diagram depicting an exemplary method for use inevaluating the watch list as seen in FIG. 14;

FIG. 16 is a schematic depicting an exemplary embodiment of amultidimensional frequency table for use in the methods of FIGS. 5-11;

FIG. 17 is a schematic depicting an IP state table for use in themethods as seen in FIGS. 5-11;

FIG. 18 is a schematic diagram depicting a table for use in the methodas seen in FIGS. 5-11;

FIG. 19 is a schematic of an exemplary embodiment of a message headerfor use in the methods as seen in FIGS. 5-11;

FIG. 20 is a schematic of an exemplary embodiment of a communicationsstream table for use in the methods as seen in FIGS. 5-11;

FIG. 21 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of anetwork security device for use in the system as seen in FIG. 1;

FIG. 22 is a block flow diagram depicting an exemplary method for use bythe system as seen in FIG. 1;

FIG. 23 is a block flow diagram depicting an exemplary method for use bythe system as seen in FIG. 1;

FIG. 24 is a block flow diagram depicting an exemplary method for use bythe system as seen in FIG. 1;

FIG. 25 is a block flow diagram depicting an exemplary method for use inthe system as seen in FIG. 1;

FIGS. 26A and 26B are block flow diagram depicting exemplary methods foruse in the system as seen in FIG. 1; and

FIG. 27 is a schematic diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of anetwork as seen in FIG. 1.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In attempting to contact and infiltrate networks, attackers or programsimplemented by the attackers act with characteristic behaviors todetermine the address of computers on local segments and communicatewith them. These behaviors may be used, separately, or in combinationwith packet signatures and filters, to identify the attackers asthreats. Once identified, communication between the network and theattacker may be controlled, preventing further damage. One method is todeceive the attacker, preventing them from either perceiving theexistence of a machine or redirecting their communication to analternative device such as a security device or sacrificial computer.

FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram depicting a network according to theinvention. An area network 14 is connected to a global network 12. Afirewall 16 may or may not be placed between the global network 12 andthe area network 14. Connected to the area network 14 may be routers 20,switches 22, security devices 24, servers 26, workstations 28, portabledevices 30, and gateway devices 34, among others. The network 14 haseither a security device 24 or some other computational device that actsto detect attacks on the area network 14 and mask other devices attachedto the area network 14 from the attacker. The attacker may be anattacker 18 connected to the global network 12 or an attacker 32connected to the area network 14. However, these components may or maynot be included in the system, and may be together, separate, or invarious combinations, among others.

The global network 12 may take various forms and may communicate withvarious protocols including IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP, HTTP, and FTP, amongothers.

Area network 14 may take various forms including Ethernet, WirelessEthernet, Token rings, Apple Talk, or various combinations of these,among others. In one exemplary embodiment, the area network 14 may be anEthernet network that resolves logical and physical network addressesusing an address resolution protocol (ARP). The ARP resolves theaddresses between Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and physical addresssuch as media access control (MAC) addresses.

The security device 24 or some other computational device such as aserver 26, workstation 28, routers 20, switches 22, or gateways 34,among others, may function to detect attacks on the area network 14.Singly or in combination these devices may hold and compile a list ofdevices, MAC addresses, or source IP addresses of devices that representa threat to the system. Using this list, the device or devices maycapture packets, compare the MAC address, source W address, or target IPaddress, with known threats to the system, and take steps to control orprevent communication with vulnerable devices.

For example, the device may create ARP packets with synthetic hardwareaddresses associated with the IP addresses of either local devices orattacking devices. In this manner, the ARP tables may be altered,causing packets to be sent across the network to physical addressesother than those targeted by the communication.

For example, the synthetic hardware addresses may be MAC addresses thatare not in use by devices on the area network 14. Alternately, thesynthetic hardware address may be the address of a sacrificial computer,defense system or security system, among others.

FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment ofthe system as seen in FIG. 1. The router 38 may or may not be connectedto the global network 37 through a wide area network 39: The router 38routes traffic from the global network 37 or wide area network 39 tovarious devices on a local area network or a local segment of a network48. The devices on the segment may include workstations 40 and 46, aserver 42, a gateway 41, and a security device 44. However, variousembodiments of network segments may be envisaged.

In this exemplary embodiment, attacker 36 may send network packetsthrough a global network 37 to router 38. Router 38 may then forward thenetwork packet to the local network 48 where the addressed devicereceives the communication. Security device 44 may capture thesepackets, determine whether the packets were sent by an IP address of adevice of interest or that represents a threat, and act to controlcommunications between the attacker 36 and the devices on the localsegment 48.

In one exemplary embodiment, a security device 44 may detect an attackon the local segment 48. The device may then create ARP packets thatinclude a synthetic physical address, and send those ARP reply packetsto a gateway device or other computational device, effectively alteringthe ARP table in that device.

FIG. 3 is a block flow diagram depicting a generic method for detectingnetwork incursion. The method includes capturing network packets fromthe local segment. From these packets tables associated with the stateof IP address, the nature of the packets and communications streams maybe established. This data may be compared to various rules to determineif an attack is occurring. In the event that an attack is occurring, thesystem may set a flag or parameter indicating that occurrence and notifypersonnel or implement a defense mechanism.

Various methods for identifying threats and therefore addresses ofdevices that represent these threats may be envisaged. One exemplaryembodiment is seen in the block flow diagram of FIG. 4.

The method 90 begins with the capturing of a network packet from thelocal segment as seen in a block 92. This packet may be a network packetcomprising data for various protocols including ARP, TCP, IP, HTTP, UDP,or FTP, among others. The method may then decode the packet as seen in ablock 94. With the decoded packet, system determines whether the packetrepresents is of interest or a known threat and may implement a controlmechanism such as adjusting an ARP table in response. For example, thesystem may compare the source or target IP address to a list of knownthreatening devices. However, alternate methods may be used indetermining the threat.

The system may then process various parts of the packet or packetformats in the appropriate manner. For example, the system may processARP packets as seen in a block 98 and TCP/IP packets as seen in a block100. However, the method may be configured to process packets using avariety networking and data linking protocols.

The system may then compare the processed information and packet to aset of, reconnaissance rules as seen in a block 102. Multiplereconnaissance rules can be used. For example, determining if the packetstrictly conforms to the protocol specification for size andconfiguration, identifying if the packet flags represent any illegalcombinations used to circumvent firewalls, or determining if the packetcontinues a pattern of packets that cumulatively represents areconnaissance event. In this manner, the system may determine whether asource computer is behaving in an appropriate manner, and if not, mayplace the address of the computer on a watch list.

Next, the system may check for target violations as seen in a block 104.These violations may include a packet addressed for an IP address knownnot to be in use, a packet addressed to a port that is known to beclosed, or an ARP request sent to an IP address that does not provide acorresponding reply.

The system may also update or add a communication stream to acommunication stream table as seen in 106. The communications streamtable may be one or more tables recording information associated withthe communications protocol used by the packet, the addresses of thedevices associated with the packet, the direction of the packet, and thetime of the last packet sent, among others. For example, the system maymaintain several tables, each uniquely associated with a communicationsprotocol. These tables may then track interactions with devices on thearea network. In this manner, the system may track a communicationstream and determine whether systems or devices are behavingappropriately.

As seen in a block 108, the system may compare the behavior of variousdevices to a set of behavior rules to determine whether a device asrepresented by its IP address is acting as a trusted device should. Forexample, a device scanning multiple IP addresses may represent a threat.Or, a device may begin receiving traffic on a port that has historicallybeen closed. Or, the device may initiate communication on portsrepresenting services that are not installed on the device. In allcases, the device would be added to a watch list. A more detailedembodiment of this method may be seen in FIGS. 5-11.

As seen in FIG. 5, the system may capture a packet 112 and decode thepacket as seen in a block 114. The system may first test to determinewhether a threat exists to the system. This test may be implemented as aflag in a data set or a test for IP addresses in a list of knownthreats, or in various other manners. For example, if a device with anIP address known to be a threat has active communications streams in oneor more communications streams tables, the system may change a flag orvariable to represent the existence of a threat condition. Over time, ifcommunication from the threatening device ceases, the system may returnto a state’ of no threat. If no threats exist, then the system may moveto the processing of ARP packets as denoted by a block A.

However, if a threat exists, the system may test the source IP addressof the packet as seen in a block 118, the target IP address as seen in ablock 120 and the target physical address as seen in a block 122. If thetarget IP address or source IP address are determined to representthreats, the system may invoke a defense mechanism as seen in block 124.This defense mechanism may include managing communications through MAClayer routing and filtering. Additional defense methods may be seen inFIGS. 25, 26A, and 26B.

To determine whether the addresses represent a threat, the system maycompare the addresses to a list of addresses of known threats.Similarly, if the target physical address is synthetic the system mayinvoke a defense as seen in a block 124. To determine whether thephysical address is synthetic, the system may compare the address to alist of known synthetic addresses, or a list of known addresses in useon a local segment. If no threat is found and the physical address isnot synthetic the system may continue as seen in a block A.

In an alternate embodiment, the system may determine whether the packetwith .the synthetic physical address represents a threat. If the packetis non-threatening, the packet may be reformulated and sent to theintended device.

FIG. 6 depicts a processing of packets that utilize the addressresolution protocol (ARP). The address resolution protocol includesprotocols for several message types. Two of the types include requestsand replies. Generally, a request from one device has a correspondingreply• from another device. A lack of a corresponding relationship mayindicate the presence of an attack.

Once the packet is tested for threats or synthetic addresses, it may betested to determine whether the packet uses ARP. If the packet does notuse ARP, a system may move on to the processing of TCP/IP packets.However, if the packet is an ARP packet, the packet may be tested forvarious types of ARP packets, and processed accordingly. For example, ifthe packet is an ARP request as seen in a block 184, the packet may befurther tested to determine •whether the packet is gratuitous as seen ina block 136. A gratuitous ARP request is typically used to announce to anetwork the presence of a new device and its address. If the packet is agratuitous ARP, the system may continue on to the processing of TCP/IPpackets.

However, if the packet is not gratuitous, the system may test todetermine whether an identical ARP request is found in an ARP queue asseen in a block 138. If an identical request is found, the packet maycontinue on to TCP/IP processing. However, if the packet is not in thequeue, the ARP request may be added to the ARP request queue as seen ina block 140, and the state of target IP may be changed to “unfulfilled”in an IP state table. In this manner, state data associated withrequests may be stored while waiting for an expected reply.

If the packet is an ARP reply as seen in a block 144, the system maytest for a corresponding ARP request in a queue as seen in a block 146and remove the corresponding ARP request from the queue as seen in ablock 148. In each case, the packet may be forwarded for TCP/IPprocessing as denoted in block C. An exemplary embodiment of an ARPrequest queue is seen and discussed in relation to FIG. 12. An exemplaryembodiment of an IP state table is seen and discussed in relation toFIG. 17.

Once ARP packets have been processed, or if the packets are determinedno˜ to be ARP packets, then they may be forwarded to TCP/IP processingas shown in FIG. 7. The packet may first be tested to determine whetherthe packet is a TCP/IP packet. If it is not, it may be forwarded toprocessing under alternate protocols or a subsequent packet may becaptured and the method re-started. For example, this may be the casefor networks with IPX/SPX communications.

If the packet is a TCP/IP packet, the source IP address is sought in afrequency table as seen in a block 154. If the source IP address is notfound in the frequency table it may be added as seen in a block 156. Ineither case, the system tests the destination IP address to determinewhether it is in .the frequency table. If the destination IP address isnot in the frequency table, it may be added. In either case, the systemmay update packet frequency values in accordance with the frequencytable as seen in a block 162. An exemplary embodiment of a frequencytable is seen and discussed in relation to FIG. 16.

FIG. 8 is an exemplary method for determining whether a packet isdesigned for reconnaissance in a local network segment. For each rule ina reconnaissance rule list, as seen in a •block 1 72, a system may testa packet to determine whether it violates the rule as seen in a block174. If the packet violates a rule, a system may note the rule and placethe IP source on a watch list as seen in a block 178. A system may thencontinue to test rules as seen in a loop from block 180 to 172. Once allthe rules are tested, the system may continue on as seen in block E.Some examples of common reconnaissance rules are: packets withparameters that violate the protocol definition, packets withinappropriate flag configurations, or packets with unusual sequencing orfragmentation.

FIG. 9 is an exemplary method for testing a target violation. Thismethod tests to determine if a packet has a destination address that isnot in use, •a port that is known to be closed, or an ARP request withan IP address that does not provide a corresponding reply. The systemtests the packet to determine whether it is an ARP request as seen in ablock 192. If the packet is an ARP request, a system checks the targetIP state to determine whether it is unfulfilled, as seen in a block 194.If it is, the system continues as seen in a block F. However, if thetarget IP state is not unfulfilled, the system notes a rule violation asdenoted by the block 200 and places the source IP address on a watchlist as seen in a block 202. If the packet is not an ARP request, thesystem tests the target IP address of the packet to determine whether itis in use as seen in a block 196. If the target IP address is in use,the system checks to see if the target port on the target device isknown to be open as seen in a block 198. If the target IP address is notin use or the target port is not known to be open, the system notes arule violation-as seen-in a block 200, and places the source IP addressof the packet on the watch list. The system then continues as denoted bya block F.

FIG. 10 is an exemplary method for updating a communication stream tablefrom block F. The packet is tested to determine whether it is includedin the communication stream table as seen in a block 212. If it is not,it is added to the table as seen in a block 214. If it is, the table isupdated with the communication stream time and direction, as seen in ablock 216. The system then continues as seen in a block G.

Once the communications tables are updated, the system may check forbehavioral rule violations. FIG. 11 is an exemplary method for testingwhether a behavior rule is violated. For each behavior rule, the systemchecks the frequency data in the frequency table to determine whether acell, row, or column in a multi-dimensional array has violated abehavioral rule boundary as seen in a block 234. If the boundary hasbeen violated, the rule is noted as seen in a block 236 and the sourceIP address is placed in a watch list as seen in a block 238. Once therules have been tested, the system returns as seen in a block H andcontinues to collect a subsequent packet, decode it, and process it inthe manner seen in FIGS. 5-11.

FIG. 12 is an exemplary embodiment of an ARP request queue. The ARPrequest queue may include a source IP address, a target IP address, asource MAC address, and the time associated with an ARP request. If acorresponding reply to the request is not received within a specifiedprogrammable period of time, the ARP request may have been initiated bya device that represents a threat.

FIG. 13 is an exemplary method in which the time is compared to a setthreat limit as seen in a block 254. If the time exceeds the threatlimit, the source IP address is placed on a watch list as seen in ablock 256. This step may be repeated for each item in the queue as seenin a block 252.

FIG. 14 represents an exemplary embodiment of a watch list. The watchlist may include a listing of potentially threatening devices. The watchlist, for example, may contain a source IP address, a target IP address,a source physical address, the time the packet was sent; and thedenotation of a rule that was violated, among others.

FIG. 15 is an exemplary method for determining whether items in a watchlist represent a threat. For each item in the watch list, the system maydetermine whether it is necessary to elevate or escalate the item to athreat as seen in a block 274. This decision may be based on the type orfrequency of rule violations, or various combinations of rule violationsand frequency violations. If it is necessary to escalate the watch listto a threat, the system may add the source IP address to a threat listas seen in a block 276. However, various methods may be envisaged.

Conversely, it may become apparent over time that a source IP addressdoes not constitute a threat, in which case it can be de-escalated. Forexample, a typographical error may have been made in a destinationaddress, without the intent or function of generating a threat. In suchan instance, de-escalation would be the appropriate way to return thesystem to a normal condition.

FIG. 16 represents an exemplary embodiment of a frequency table. In thisexemplary embodiment, a multi-dimensional table is shown with a verticalaxis of IP addresses, a horizontal axis of time, and another depth axis.The vertical axis may be a listing of IP addresses. In this exemplaryembodiment the listing of IP addresses includes all source addresses ofpackets.

The time axis may represent bins of varying periods. For example, theseperiods may represent the time since the last packet associated with theIP address or ongoing time. The number of bins may be set by a user ofthe system and the size or period represented by the bins may be set andvaried along the axis.

Looking at this two-dimensional face, the IP addresses and time, thenumber of packets sent by the IP address may be tallied over time toproduce a frequency table of packets associated with the IP address.Various methods may be used to normalize the frequency table or adjustthe values in the various time bins over time or in association with thearrival or transmission of subsequent packets. In one exemplaryembodiment, each bin (representing a period less than the period of themost recent packet may be decremented uniformly or with somedistribution.

In the multi-dimensional case, other axes may be represented by packetsize, destination IP addresses, protocols, message types, and othercharacteristics. Various behavioral rules may then be established thatidentify threats by exceeding the boundaries assigned to various cells,columns, or rows. For example, if a single source as represented by itsIP address were to frequently send packets into the network to multipleunused IP addresses, that source may be identified as a potential threatseeing the addresses of devices. In other example, if various sourcesflood a single IP address with messages, it may be determined that adenial of services attack is occurring.

FIG. 17 represents an IP state table. Recall that when an ARP request isidentified and added to the ARP request table, the IP state of thetarget IP address or device is set to “unfulfilled” in an IP statetable. Traditionally, an IP address may be in use or not in use. Thissystem, however, tracks various additional states including omitted,automatic, used, unfulfilled, virtual, and unknown. The system uses theIP state table to monitor IP addresses associated with the local networksegment and those addresses on the threat list. The IP state tableprovides the system with a method of monitoring the state of IPaddresses on a dynamically changing network segment.

In the case of an ARP request sent to a target IP address, the systemsets the state of the target IP address to unfulfilled. If a reply tothe ARP request is not received by the source IP address within a givenperiod of time, the target IP address state may be set to virtual. It ispossible that the target address is not in use. If a packet is sent froman IP address that is marked as unknown, the system attempts toascertain the true state of the IP address through various active andpassive means. When the true state of the IP address is determined, thestate table is updated with the appropriate state value.

Since communication between devices is perceived through packets, thestate of the network may be tracked through the IP State table. FIG. 18depicts a conceptual chart of communications. An IP address may be inuse or not in use. A packet may be sent from a source IP address knownto be in use to a destination IP address. If the destination IP addressis not in use, the sending of the packet to that destination address maybe a first clue in perceiving network incursion. Similarly, a sending ofa packet from a source known not to be in use may indicate addressspoofing by an intruder.

However, a single packet such as an ARP request does not indicatewhether the destination IP address is in use. An ARP reply wouldindicate the use of the destination address. Failure to reply mayindicate that the destination address is an unused IP address. However,a device associated with the destination address may have been busy. Assuch, the devices may be categorized in the state table in categoriesindicative of knowledge or expectation obtained from observation ofother communication with those devices.

Turning to FIG. 19, an ARP reply packet 290 is depicted. In thisexemplary embodiment, the ARP reply packet 290 is depicted as having .asource IP address 292 with an associated hardware address 294. Theassociated hardware address is, in this example, a synthetic hardwareaddress. The message 290 also contains a destination IP address 296 anda hardware address 298 associated with the destination IP address 296.If such a message were sent on a local network segment, the ARP tableassociated with the destination IP address 296 and hardware address 298would be adjusted. Any subsequent communications sent to the source IPaddress from the device associated with the destination address would besent to an incorrect hardware address, preventing communications withthe source device, represented in the ARP reply packet 290. Thedestination device may be a server, gateway, workstation, or othernetwork device. In this manner, communications may be controlled betweenattacking devices and devices on the local segment of the network.

Turning to the next figure, FIG. 20 depicts an exemplary embodiment of acommunications stream table. The communications stream table is one ormore tables tracking communications between devices. In one exemplaryembodiment, the communications stream tables are tables that each trackcommunications associated with a single protocol. For example, tablesmay be used to track ICMP, TCP, UDP, and ARP communications. The tablesmay be associated with the addresses of two devices associated with thenumber and frequency of data, direction, statistical information, andtime of last ‘packet. The communication streams tables may beperiodically polled to aid in setting the state of IP addresses in theIP state table. For example, if the age of a communications streamexceeds some value, the system may attempt to contact the deviceassociated with the IP address to determine whether it is active or theaddress is in use. If the device does not respond, the device may beremoved from the IP state table. Furthermore, the communications streamtables may be updated if a communications stream becomes stale.

FIG. 21 is an exemplary embodiment of a security device for performingthe functionality described in the various methods herein. The securitydevice 310 may include a processor 312, a network interface 314, amemory 316, and a user interface 340. The device 310 may also include anARP request queue 318, an IP state table 320, a frequency table 322; anARP table 324, a watch list 326, a threat list 328, packetreconnaissance rules 330, behavior rules 332, a MAC address table 334,one •or more communications stream tables 336, and various instructions338, among others. However, each of these elements may or may not beincluded together, separately, or in various combinations, among others.For example, the data and instructions may reside on a single device oron various devices, among others.

The processor 312 may take various forms including variousmicroprocessors, computational circuitries, and controllers, amongothers. The processor 312 may interpret various instructions or data andfunction accordingly.

A network interface 314 may take various forms. These forms may includean Ethernet NIC, a serial cable, a USB port, an AppleTalk connection,and a wireless Ethernet connection, among others. The network interfacemay function to aid in capturing network packets, sending appropriatemessages across the network, and communications with other devices,among others.

The memory 316 may take various forms including ROM, RAM, flash memory,disc drives, floppy drives, CD ˜OM's, and DVD ROM's, among others.

The system 310 may or may not include a user interface 340. This userinterface may take various forms including a hand-held device, akeyboard, a monitor, a mouse, and remote access interfaces, amongothers.

The ARP request queue 318 is a listing of ARP requests and the time theywere sent. The system attempts to match ARP requests with acorresponding ARP reply. If no match is found over a given period oftime, a rule may be violated and the source IP of the ARP request may beplaced on a watch list. The table may take various forms including adatabase file, a tab delimited file, a spreadsheet, a text file, a datafile, among others.

The IP state table 320 may include a listing of IP addresses and anassociated state. Generally the state is either active or inactive.However, the system applies varying states to the IP address includingomitted, automatic, used, unfulfilled, virtual, and unknown, amongothers. The table may take various forms including a database file, atab delimited file, a spreadsheet, a text file, or a data file, amongothers.

The frequency table 322 may take various forms, including that shown inFIG. 16. The frequency table may store data associated with an IPaddress and the frequency of packet delivery over time. Further, thetable may be structured as a multi-dimensional data set with other axesincluding protocols, packet size, communications type, and’ destinationaddress, among others. The frequency table may take various formsincluding a database file, a tab delimited file, a spreadsheet, a textfile, a data file, among others.

The ARP table 324 is typically a listing of IP addresses and anassociated physical address on the network. Generally, most devicesconnected to the network maintain an ARP table. This system maycommunicate with various devices on a network to adjust valuesmaintained in the various ARP tables.

The watch list 326 may take the form as seen in FIG. 14. The watch listmay include a listing of IP addresses that have violated various rules.IP addresses listed in the watch list may be elevated and identified aspotential threats, and placed in a threat list 328. The threat list maybe a listing of IP addresses associated with devices that are known tobe threats to the system. This list may be used to determine whichpackets entering the local network segment represent a threat and toprevent those packets from accessing devices on the local segments.

A device 310 may include packet reconnaissance rules 330. These rulesmay be used to determine from the packet information whether the packetis designed to reconnoiter on the local segment. If the packet violatesthese rules, the source IP address for the packet may be placed on thewatch list.

The behavioral rules 332 may be rules, boundaries, or thresholds thatare compared to frequency table 322. If cells, columns, or rows violatethese boundaries or thresholds, the IP address associated• with theviolation may be marked as a potential threat and placed on a watch listor the threat list 328.

The system may also include a table of synthetic MAC addresses.Alternately, the system may include a version of an ARP tableassociating IP address with real physical addresses, or a combination ofboth synthetic MAC addresses and real physical addresses. It should beunderstood through this description of an illustrative embodiment, thatalthough the use of tables is mentioned here, the present invention mayuse other types of persistent, logically addressable storage mechanismsfor the different types of addresses. In either case, the table may beused to determine whether an address is a synthetic address and be usedin re-creating or re-structuring the packets for delivery to theappropriate physical device.

The Communications stream table or tables 336 may take various formsincluding a database file, a tab delimited file, a spreadsheet, a textfile, a data file, among others. The communications stream tables 336may track communications between devices as discussed in relationship toFIG. 20.

The instructions 338 may include various operating instructions andcomputer-implemented instructions for implementing the methods herein,among others. These instructions may take the form of interpretiveinstructions, programs, and additional data, among others.

However, these elements may or may not be included together, separately,or in various combinations, among others. For example, various devicesmay be combined to function and store the data and instructionsdescribed above.

FIG. 22 is another exemplary method for perceiving threats to thesystem. Hereto the system captures the packet as seen in a block 354.The system determines whether the packet is an ARP packet as seen in ablock 356. The packet may be an ARP request or an ARP reply as seen in ablock 358. From this it may be determined whether the source IP addressis a threat as seen in a block 362, or not a threat as seen in a block360.

Further, the packet may be tested to determine whether it is a TCP/IPpacket as seen in a block 364. If it is not a TCP/IP packet, it may beignored as seen in a block 366 or forwarded for processing in accordancewith other packet protocols. If the packet is a TCP/IP packet, adestination IP address may be tested as seen in a block 368. If thedestination IP address is not in use, the source IP address mayrepresent a threat as seen in a block 370. If the destination IP addressis in use, the packet may be subjected to further tests. For example,the packet may be tested to determine whether it represents areconnaissance packet as seen in a block 372. If it is a reconnaissancepacket, the source IP address may be a threat as seen in a block 374.

Further, the packet may be tested to determine whether it violates afrequency rule as seen in a block 376 or a target port frequency rule asseen in a block 380. In either case, a violation of a rule may indicatethat the source IP address is a threat as seen in blocks 378 and 382,respectively. Further, the packet may be tested to determine whether itviolates the aggregate rules as seen in a block 384. If it does violatethese rules, it may represent a threat as seen in a block 386. However,if the packet does not violate the rules, it may not represent a threatas seen in a block 388.

FIG. 23 is an exemplary method for creating and maintaining an IPaddress state table. Hereto the system may capture a packet as seen in ablock 394. The system may test to determine whether the source IP stateis known. If it is not known, the system may set the source IP state asseen in a block 398 and note the time as seen in a block 400. If it isknown, the system may test to determine whether the destination IPaddress state is known. If that state is not known, the destination IPaddress state may be set as seen in a block 406, and the time noted, asseen in a block 408. Further, the system may test the packetconfiguration to determine whether the source IP state requires changeas seen in a block 412. If the source IP state is to be changed, thesystem may change these source IP states as seen in a block 414 and notethe time as seen in a block 416. In either case, the system may furthertest to determine whether the destination IP state requires change asseen in a block 418. If change is required, the system may change thestate of the target IP address as seen in a block 420 and note the timeas seen in a block 422.

FIG. 24 represents adjustment of an IP address state. In this case, thesystem checks the time as seen in a block 434. The system determineswhether there is an appropriate time to check the IP state as seen in ablock 436. If it is not, the system does nothing as seen in a block 438.If it is time to check the states, the system checks each entry on an IPstate table as seen in a block 440. If enough time has elapsed, as seenin a block 442, the system adjusts the IP state as seen in a block 446.

FIG. 25 is an exemplary embodiment of a defense method as described inrelation to FIG. 5. The system may accept a packet as seen in a block472. The system may test the source IP address of the packet todetermine whether it represents a threat. If the source IP address doesnot represent a threat, the system may accept a subsequent packet. Ifthe source IP address does represent a threat, the system may test thepacket for various protocols and packet types as seen in blocks 476, 480and 484. For example, if the packet as an ARP request from a knownthreat, the system may send an appropriately crafted ARP reply. Thereply fools an attacking computer into believing that a computer existsat the target IP address and sets the stage to allow for futureconnections.

If the packet is an ICMP echo request as seen in a block 480, the systemmay send an appropriately crafted ICMP echo reply as seen in a block482. In this case, an attacker may be performing reconnaissance. Anappropriate response makes the attacking computer believe a realcomputer exists at the target IP address.

If the packet is a TCP packet as seen in a block 184, the system maytest for various types of TCP packets. For example, the system may testto determine whether the TCP packet is a SYN request as seen in a block486. If it is, the system may create an appropriate acknowledgementresponse as seen in a block 488. This acknowledgement response mayinclude the TCP window size set to zero and the data of payload size setto a very small number as seen in blocks 490 and 492. The TCP SYNrequest indicates that an attacker may be trying to connect the firsttime. By sending the suggested response, the attacker's computer isprovided with parameters requiring it to do extra work sending smallpackets and effectively occupying computational cycles. If enoughthreads of such TCP packets are sent out, communications to theattacker's computer may effectively be slowed.

If the TCP packet is a window probe packet as seen in 496, the attackermay be trying to increase the speed of their attack by requesting averification of a maximum window size. Here, to, an appropriate TCPresponse packet may be crafted as seen in a block 498. Again, the TCPwindow size may be set to zero and the window probe response packet besent as seen in blocks 500 and 502, respectively. If the TCP packet isan ACK packet, the attacker may be sending the attacking packets.Typically, the attacker's computer will wait about four minutes beforebeing allowed to try and send another packet. In this case, if thepacket is ignored as seen in a block 506, the attacker's efforts areeffectively slowed while his computer waits over the appropriateresponse period.

FIGS. 26A and 26B represent a potential defense against an attack. Inthis method 510, the communications between an attacking computer andother devices on the local network is controlled. The system may accepta packet as seen in a block 512. The source IP address and the target IPaddress may be tested to determine whether they represent a threat asseen in blocks 514 and 520, respectively. If they do represent a threat,the target physical address may be tested to determine whether it is asynthetic address as seen in a block 516. If the target physical addressis synthetic, the packet may be dropped as seen in a block 518 orforwarded to an alternate device or appropriate network security devicesuch as a sacrificial computer or other defense device. The targetphysical address or synthetic address may be hardware addresses such asMAC addresses.

If the target physical address is not synthetic, then the system may beunder attack from a new source and an appropriate control must beimplemented. In this case, the IP address is tested to determine whetherthe source is on the local network as seen in a block 530. If the sourceis on the local network, then a single synthetic physical address iscreated. The synthetic physical address may, for example, be an addressnot in use on the local segment. Then, for each local device on thelocal segment, the system may create an ARP packet using the attacker'ssource IP address and the synthetic physical address as the source ofthe ARP packet as seen in a block 536. An example of the ARP packet isdescribed in relation to FIG. 19. The destination of the ARP packet maybe the IP address and physical address of the local device as seen in ablock 538. The packet may then be sent as seen in a block 540. Thisprocess is repeated for all devices on the local network. This methodeffectively adjusts the ARP tables on local devices, providing a falseaddress for the attacker's computer.

Subsequently, for each device on a local network segment, a uniquesynthetic physical address may be created in a process similar to thatseen in a block 552. An ARP packet may then be created using the localdevice source IP address and the synthetic MAC address as the source ofthe ARP packet. The physical address of the threat may be set as thedestination of the ARP packet similar to that seen in a block 556. Then,the ARP packet may be sent to the threat similar to that seen in a block558. Again, this process is repeated for all devices on the localnetwork. In effect, communications emanating from the threat enteringare sent to addresses other than those of the devices on the localnetwork, masking those devices.

If the source is not on the local network, then for each device on alocal network segment, a unique synthetic physical address may becreated as seen in a block 552. An ARP packet may then be created usingthe local device source IP address and the synthetic MAC address as thesource of the ARP packet. The physical address of the default gatewaysmay be set as the destination of the ARP packet as seen in a block 556.Then, the ARP packet may be sent to the default gateway as seen in ablock 558. Again, this process is repeated for all devices on the localnetwork. In effect, communications entering the local network are sentto addresses other than those of the devices on the local network,masking those devices from devices external to the network.

If however, the source IP address and the target IP address are not ofinterest or do not represent threats, the packet may be tested todetermine whether the target physical address is synthetic as seen in ablock 552. If the target address is synthetic, the system may replacethe synthetic address with an appropriate real address of the targetdevice as seen in a block 524. Subsequently, the system may send thereformulated packet as seen in a block 526.

In performing this method, the system may maintain a listing ofsynthetic hardware or physical addresses and the real hardware orphysical address on the network. When checking for a synthetic address,the system may compare the hardware address to the list. When seeking toreform the packet, the system may substitute the real hardware orphysical address for the synthetic address.

FIG. 27 is a schematic block diagram depicting an exemplary embodimentof a system. In this case, a local network segment is depicted to theright side of a router. Along the segment may be physical devices 1 and2, and a security device D. There may also be various physicaladdresses, S 1, S2 and S3 that are not in use on the local networksegment. If a threat penetrates the local network segment as denoted bythe “T” block to the right of the router, then any communications withthe threat outside the local network segment may be effectivelycontrolled by preventing devices 1 and 2 from communicating with thethreat. In this case, the ARP tables of these devices 1 and 2 may beadjusted such that they send their responses to a synthetic address onthe network. In this manner, the threat inside the local network segmentwill never receive a reply to any messages sent to devices 1 and 2 onthe local network segment. This disruption may be accomplished by asecurity device D sending an ARP packet to devices 1 and 2 providingthem with a false physical address associated with the threat's IPaddress.

In another exemplary embodiment, the threat may exist outside the localnetwork segment as denoted by the threat block. In this case, the threatmay-be mitigated by providing a false physical address for each deviceon the local network. In this case, any communications designed to go todevice 1 or 2 may be instead be directed to a synthetic address such asS 1 or S2 the security device D may send synthetic addresses for eachdevice 1 and 2 on the network to a gateway device. In this manner, whenthe gateway device seeks to route communications from the threat outsidethe local network segment to devices on the network, it instead sendsthese packets to the synthetic address S 1 and S2, respectively.

Aspects of the invention may be found in a system, method and computerreadable medium for managing logical and physical address statelifecycles. Aspects of the invention may be found in a system, method,and computer-readable medium for managing logical and physical addressstate lifecycles. The method can include assigning a respective state ofunknown to a first address of multiple addresses when the respectivestate of the first address has not been assigned. The method furtherincludes changing the respective state of the first address when acommunication is targeted to the first address. The addresses caninclude all valid logical addresses for a corresponding set of deviceson a segment of a network, or all valid physical addresses for acorresponding set of devices on a segment of a network.

The respective state of the first address can be changed to used whenthe communication indicates that the first address corresponds to adevice in use. The respective state of the first address can be changedto unfulfilled when the communication includes an address resolutionprotocol request sent to a device having the first address when a timelimit .for a response to the address resolution protocol request has notexpired. The respective state of the first address can be changed toomitted when the first address corresponds to a device, andcommunication with the device is omitted from being observed. Inaddition, the respective state of the first address can be changed toomitted when the respective state of the first address is programmed tobe omitted from the changing.

The respective state of the first address can be changed to virtual whenthe communication is received at the first address when the respectivestate of the first address is unfulfilled, and a time limit forresponding to the communication expires before a response is sent by thefirst address. The respective state of the first address can be changedto unknown when the respective state of the first address is notunknown, and the first address does not participate in the communicationwithin a time limit. The respective state of the first address can bechanged to automatic when an automatic reply is programmed to be sent toa second address when the first address receives a packet from thesecond address.

Additional aspects of the invention may be found in a system formanaging logical and physical address state lifecycles. The system maybe a computational device including a processor or network interface andmemory or computer-readable medium, among others. The device may or maynot include a user interface. Further, the device may have various dataand instructions associated with various methods for managing logicaland physical address state lifecycles. These data may include an ARPrequest queue, an IP state table, a frequency table, an ARP table, awatch list, a threat list, a synthetic physical address table, and acommunications stream table, among others. The device may also includepacket instructions for evaluating reconnaissance rules, behavioralrules and other rules, among others. Further, the system may includesoftware or computer interpretable instructions for performing variousmethods associated with maintaining the data in the tables andcollecting the data for the tables.

As such, a system, method and computer-readable medium for managinglogical and physical address state lifecycles are described. In view ofthe above detailed description of the present invention and associateddrawings, other modifications and variations will now become apparent tothose skilled in the art. It should also be apparent that such othermodifications and variations may be effected without departing from thespirit and scope of the present invention as set forth in the claimswhich follow.

1-6. (canceled)
 7. A method comprising: capturing a data packet from anetwork; determining whether the data packet is associated with a knownthreat based on whether an address in the data packet is in a table ofaddresses associated with known threats; processing the data packet whenthe data packet is not associated with one of the known threats based ona protocol of the data packet to generate processed information;comparing the processed information to a set of reconnaissance rules;and determining that the data packet is associated with a new threat ifthe processed information violates one of the set of reconnaissancerules.
 8. A method according to claim 7, further comprising updating thetable of addresses to indicate that the address is associated with thenew threat when the processed information violates the one of the set ofreconnaissance rules.
 9. A method according to claim 7, furthercomprising testing the address to determine that the data packet isassociated with the new threat, the address comprising at least one of asource internet protocol (IP) address, a target IP address, or a targetphysical address when the processed information violates one of the setof reconnaissance rules; and invoking a defense mechanism against thethreat.
 10. A method according to claim 9, wherein invoking the defensemechanism comprises sending a reply to the source IP address torepresent that a computer is accessible via the target IP address, thereply to entice an attacking computer to continue communication with thetarget IP address without spreading the new threat to the network.
 11. Amethod according to claim 9, further comprising, when at least one ofthe source IP address or the target IP address is determined to beassociated with the new threat, dropping the data packet when the targetphysical address is synthetic.
 12. A method according to claim 9,further comprising: in response to determining that the target physicaladdress is synthetic, replacing the target physical address in the datapacket with a real address of a target device; and sending the datapacket with the real address of the target device.
 13. A methodaccording to claim 9, wherein invoking the defense mechanism comprises:when the source IP address is determined to be associated with the newthreat, determining whether the source IP address is located within thenetwork; generating an address control reply packet using a falsephysical address; sending the address control reply packet to a defaultgateway when the source IP address is not located within the network;and sending the address control reply packet to the source IP addresswhen the source IP address is located within the network.
 14. Anapparatus comprising: a data analyzer to capture a data packet from anetwork, determine whether the data packet is associated with a knownthreat based on whether an address in the data packet is in a table ofaddresses associated with known threats; a data processor to process thedata packet when the data packet is not associated with a known threatbased on a protocol of the data packet to generate process information;a rules analyzer to compare the processed information to a set ofreconnaissance rules and determine that the data packet is associatedwith a new threat if the processed information violates one of the setof rules.
 15. An apparatus according to claim 14, further comprising atable updater to update the table of addresses to indicate that theaddress is associated with the new threat when the processed informationviolates the one of the reconnaissance rules.
 16. An apparatus accordingto claim 14, further comprising: a tester to test the address todetermine that the packet is associated with the new threat, the addresscomprising at least one of a source internet protocol (IP) address, atarget IP address, or a target physical address; and a defender toinvoke a defense mechanism against the new threat.
 17. An apparatusaccording to claim 16, wherein the defender invokes the defensemechanism by sending a reply to the source IP address to represent thata computer is accessible via the target IP address, the reply to enticean attacking computer to continue communication with the target IPaddress without spreading the new threat to the network.
 18. Anapparatus according to claim 16, wherein, when at least one of thesource IP address or target IP address is determined to be associatedwith a threat, the defender is to drop the data packet when the targetphysical address is synthetic.
 19. An apparatus according to claim 16,wherein the defender, in response to determining that the targetphysical address is synthetic, is to replace the target physical addressin the data packet with a real physical address of the target, and is tosend the data packet with the real physical address of the target. 20.An apparatus according to claim 16, wherein the defender, in response todetermining the source IP address is associated with the new threat, isfurther to determine whether the source IP address is located within thenetwork, generate an address control reply packet using a false physicaladdress, send the address control reply packet to a default gateway whenthe source IP address is not located within the network, and send theaddress control reply packet to the source IP address when the source IPaddress is located within the network.
 21. A storage device or storagedisc comprising instructions that, when executed, cause a machine to atleast: capture a data packet from a network; determine whether the datapacket is associated with a known threat based on whether an address inthe data packet is in a table of addresses associated with knownthreats; process the data packet when the data packet is not associatedwith a known threat based on a protocol of the data packet to generateprocessed information; compare the processed information to a set ofreconnaissance rules; and determine that the data packet is associatedwith a new threat if the processed information violates one of the setof reconnaissance rules.
 22. A storage device or storage disc accordingto claim 21, wherein the instructions, when executed, further cause themachine to: update the table of addresses to indicate that the addressis associated with the new threat when the processed informationviolates the one of the set of reconnaissance rules.
 23. A storagedevice or storage disc according to claim 21, wherein the instructions,when executed, further cause the machine to: test the address todetermine that the data packet is associated with the new threat, theaddress comprising at least one of a source internet protocol (IP)address, a target IP address, or a target physical address when theprocessed information violates one of the set of reconnaissance rules;and invoke a defense mechanism against the threat.
 24. A storage deviceor storage disc according to claim 23, wherein the instructions, whenexecuted, further cause the machine to: invoke the defense mechanism bysending a reply to the source IP address to represent that a computer isaccessible via the target IP address, the reply to entice an attackingcomputer to continue communication with the target IP address withoutspreading the threat to the network.
 25. A storage device or storagedisc according to claim 23, wherein the instructions, when executed,further cause the machine to: in response to determining that thewhether the target physical address is synthetic, replace the targetphysical address with a real physical address of the target in the datapacket; and send the data packet with the real physical address of thetarget.
 26. A storage device or storage disc according to claim 23,wherein, when the source IP address is determined to be associated witha threat, the instructions, when executed, further cause the machine to:determine whether the source IP address is located within the network;generate an address control reply packet using a false physical address;send the address control reply packet to a default gateway when thesource IP address is not located within the network; and send theaddress control reply packet to the source IP address when the source IPaddress is located within the network.